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Abstract
In the present article, we compare the models that the management in two leading com-
mercial Norwegian media organizations, one with a foothold in the written press, Verdens 
Gang (VG), and one in television, TV 2, have used in dealing with the disruptive change in 
news caused by the introduction of rolling news. Both started with an experimental internal 
phase but later used different models to organize their news production. By establishing a 
spin-off, separate from the printed newspaper, VG retreated from synergies between online 
and offline productions, but gained by having two organizations dedicated to the processes 
and values of each medium. Their online services are financed by advertisements alone. The 
commercially financed television channel, TV 2, used an acquisition model, but encountered 
problems with integrating the parts. Today, their strategy involves a proliferation of digital 
TV channels, financed by a combination of advertisements and payment from viewers. Not 
only their Internet site, but particularly their 24/7 news channel Nyhetskanalen is a central 
element in the production of continous news.
Keywords: convergence, continuous news, disruptive change, management
Introduction
Market leaders often experience difficulties adjusting to what Christensen and Overdorf 
(2000) call ‘disruptive change’. Implementing innovative activity in an area that requires 
not only investments but also changes in competencies, organizational processes and 
values is often difficult to realize within established organizations. For news organiza-
tions, the production of rolling news represented a disruptive change. Digitization and 
digital distribution implied a shift in their core product: not only did it become neces-
sary to design online news differently, but even more fundamentally digital production 
and distribution introduced a change from deadline-based production to the continuous 
production of news, ‘rolling’ or ‘liquid’ news (cf. Deuze 2008: 205), which requires 
new organizational forms. 
Christensen and Overdorf identify three models for firms to tackle disruptive innova-
tion. They can (1) initiate innovation within the existing corporate structures, they can 
(2) use an acquisition model and buy a company that already produces the innovative 
product, or they can (3) use a spinout model by establishing an independent organiza-
tion. These models have implications for the way the existing offline and new online 
production processes are integrated or separated. In a digital environment that enables 
the seamless integration of a host of digital services, this integration or separation is a 
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major issue. News content can be reused, refashioned and distributed through different 
media outlets. Managers’ tasks include not only introducing new technology and com-
petencies in order to develop rolling news on its own terms, but also deciding how to 
organize rolling news production with their total product portfolio, namely, traditional 
news production and other services they provide. In addition they have to decide how 
to finance their activities. As users have become used to online news free of charge, 
the question of creating healthy business models has become pressing, to say the least. 
Several studies have dealt with the introduction and production of online news in 
established organizations, but specific comparisons between organizations originating 
from different media are rare and called for (Erdal 2008: 79; Moe & Syvertsen 2007). 
In the present article, we ask what models, or combination of models, the management 
in two leading commercial Norwegian media organizations – one with a foothold in 
the written press, Verdens Gang (VG), and one in television, TV 2 – have used in deal-
ing with the disruptive change in news caused by the introduction of continuous news 
production. More specifically, we focus on how management of these two organizations 
over time has handled this change by looking at the combination of activities they have 
chosen to engage in, the way they have organized it and the way they have financed it. 
Method
The present study is part of a more comprehensive study of news production in TV 2 
and VG, based on participant observation, interviews with various actors on different 
levels of the organizations and analyses of relevant (internal and external) documents. 
For this article, we mainly draw upon the semi-structured qualitative interviews with 
managers from TV 2 and VG (see references) we carried out in 2007-2009.1 For TV 2, 
we chose to interview middle and senior managers responsible for both the television 
and the Internet. As the paper and online editions of VG were separate, we concentrated 
on the online organization VG Multimedia. The questions we asked were intended to 
help us gain insight into their perspectives on these developments and their justifica-
tions for choice of models. The interviews with the editors-in-chief from TV 2 and VG 
Multimedia have also provided us with critical information about the decisions made 
at the corporate level – decisions that we also verified through inspecting the annual 
reports. More detailed studies of how the new technology was implemented on the level 
of production are the subject of future articles. 
The Challenge of Convergence
Today almost all traditional media provide continuous news, but their backgrounds are 
different. While printed newspapers like VG operate in relation to deadlines, online 
news on their websites can be updated constantly. Online news media are, in addition, 
increasingly involved with the production and mediation of video on their sites, and 
they sometimes even offer live video, which was an area formerly reserved for televi-
sion. News content can be repurposed online, and additional services can be offered on 
the Internet. 
Traditional general-purpose broadcasters like TV 2, with regularly scheduled news-
casts, now also face a new situation. For them news production is only part of more 
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general television programming. During the past decade, television production and 
recently distribution have been digitized, which has created new possibilities for news 
production and distribution. In addition, the Internet offers them the same opportunities 
it offers newspapers, that is, the production of unlimited quantities of news items and 
the ability to supplement their stories with other web-based services. 
Together with digitization we also see ‘organizational convergence’ in the form of 
media houses that both develop a product portfolio across different platforms and in-
tegrate cross-media production in multi-media editorial boards (cf. Puijk 2007, Erdal 
2008). Different models have been presented to describe the different forms of coopera-
tion and integration within media organizations, some of which also acknowledge the 
coexistence of convergence and divergence (cf. Dailey et al. 2003; Boczkowski 2004, 
Garcia Avilés & Carvajal 2008, Garcia Avilés et al. 2009, Storsul & Stuedahl 2007). 
The model presented by Dailey et al. is a continuum of increasing integration in media 
production with five stages: cross-promotion, cloning, competition, content-sharing and 
convergence. Hjeltnes et al. (2008) have applied this model to monitor ten Norwegian 
media houses. Their analysis shows that the ten media houses are divided over all stages, 
and they note that status differences between the media and cultural differences between 
the journalists impede integration (2008: 19-20). 
This model, however, has been criticized for being implicitly normative because it 
implies that the ‘natural’ movement is towards more convergence (Deuze 2007: 140; 
Garcia Avilés & Carvaial 2008: 225; Erdal 2008: 71). Indeed, media organizations may 
very well not aim at becoming fully convergent. Even though digitization enables the 
integration of formerly separate media, the different kinds of content still require differ-
ent technology, competencies and organizational forms (e.g., digital multicamera video 
production versus online text production). Managers have to take these differences into 
account when deciding what technology to use and how to organize new forms of pro-
duction in relation to existing ones. Instead of Dailey et al.’s incremental model, Chris-
tensen and Overdorf offer models that distinguish fundamental different approaches.
Disruptive Innovation
Christensen and Overdorf (2000, see also Christensen 1997) differentiate between 
sustaining and disruptive innovation. While sustaining innovation offers customers a 
product or service that performs better in ways that customers in the mainstream market 
already value, disruptive innovations create an entirely new market for a new kind of 
product or service. 
The Internet represents a new media that conforms to the definition of disruptive in-
novation because it ‘creates an entirely new market through the introduction of a new 
kind of product or service, one that’s actually worse, initially, as judged by the perfor-
mance metrics that mainstream customers value’ (Christensen & Overdorf 2000: 7). One 
important factor in explaining why market leaders often fail in disruptive innovation, 
according to Christensen and Overdorf, is that their values prohibit their entering new 
and developing areas. These new areas will not be large and profitable enough relative 
to the standards of their existing markets (2000: 8), but in time the new product may 
surpass and make redundant the established ones.
Introduction of the Internet offered a completely new technology in which both 
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producers and users had to invest. Before 2000, the (news) offer on the Internet was far 
more limited than that in the existing media. For the news providers it appeared to be 
an unprofitable technology that demanded investments and experimentation, while it 
was not obvious which business model would eventually be profitable. 
According to Christensen and Overdorf, organizations have basic capabilities in the 
form of resources (people, equipment, information, established networks as well as 
brands and design), processes (patterns of interaction, coordination, communication and 
decision-making) and values (standards by which employees on all levels set priorities). 
New products or services may involve not only different resources, but often also dif-
ferent processes and values. 
Ethnographic studies on online journalism have documented differences between 
on- and offline production (cf. Domingo 2006, Paterson & Domingo 2008, Erdal 2008). 
These studies have documented the new working routines and divisions of labour (e.g., 
journalists involved in multi-media production, constant updating of stories, publica-
tion without the involvement of editors and page setters), and the different values be-
tween the different media. Domingo finds that the online journalists whom he observed 
developed the value of being first with a story ‘to obsessive rates’ (Domingo 2004: 
1). Further, Domingo and others have shown how the different media themselves are 
valued differently – typically with television on top of the hierarchy and the Internet 
at the bottom (Domingo 2006, Erdal 2008, Puijk 2007). Integrating online and offline 
production may be difficult, as processes and values implied in the production of dif-
ferent media impede smooth internal cooperation. Using Christensen and Overdorf’s 
approach, specialization is one of the alternatives to full integration, even though this 
may restrict the advantages of fully using the possibilities of digital media to integrate 
production, to repurpose content, etc. 
Processes and values in well-functioning organizations are stable and adapted to 
existing conditions. Christensen and Overdorf identify three ways for firms to create 
new capabilities that can enable them to accommodate disruptive innovation (2000: 
8-12). One way is to create new organizational structures within corporate boundaries 
in which new processes can be developed. This alternative is often difficult because it 
requires the creation of different ‘spaces’ with different processes and values within a 
single organization. The acquisition of existing organizations that match the required 
processes and values is another way to enter a new market, but it presupposes that the 
acquired organization will have relative freedom to continue its operations. Often, as 
soon as the acquisition is integrated into the main organization, it loses its capabili-
ties, as corporate values and processes are forced upon it. In most cases of disruptive 
innovation, Christensen and Overdorf recommend the ‘spinout’ or ramification of an 
independent organization to develop necessary processes and values that are adjusted 
to the needs of the new product.
Changes in VG and TV 2
In this section, we will analyse how two traditional commercial market leaders in Nor-
way have handled the disruptive innovation of the Internet in the period 1995-2009, and 
consider what models they have used in their organization of combined online and offline 
production, and what business models they have used. Their models have changed over 
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time, and for each organization we identify different phases in which they changed their 
strategy. In VG’s development, we have discerned two phases: after an experimental 
period where they developed their Internet offer internally, VG chose a spinout model, 
and, apart from refining it over the years, has continued with this model. Within the same 
general structure they also developed their online video offer in an innovative way. For 
TV 2 we distinguish three phases: after an initial internal phase, they attempted to fol-
low an acquisition model, but, as this did not work, they changed to a more integrated 
model. These changes occurred in a period of about two years (2006-2008), but we will 
use the year 2007 in our periodization. 
Newspaper: VG
Members of the Norwegian Resistance established VG shortly after World War II (July 
23, 1945). It soon became a popular newspaper with nationwide distribution. It is to-
day 100 per cent owned by the Schibsted Group, which also owns other major Nordic 
newspapers like Aftonbladet, Svenska Dagbladet and Aftenposten (Lund et al. 2009). 
Until they sold their shares in 2006, Schibsted also was involved in TV 2 (Norway) and 
TV4 (Sweden).
VG was the first newspaper in Norway to change to a tabloid format in 1963. It has 
been the largest newspaper in Norway since the 1980s, with 10.3 per cent of the total 
market, and 49 per cent of sales to non-subscribers in 2008. The paper edition reached 
its peak in 2002 with an average circulation of 390,510 copies daily. Since 2002 the 
circulation figures have been steadily falling, and in 2009 they dropped to 262,374.2 
Online VG Nett is the most popular Internet site in Norway with more than 2.8 million 
unique viewers a week in 2008.3
Phase 1: Internal Model – Experimentations (1995-2000)
VG’s online edition, VG Nett, was established in 1995. During the first year they re-
circulated material from the written edition online. Thereafter, VG Nett began to produce 
its own content but was still organized as part of the newspaper. The news editor for 
multimedia at the time claims that VG spent ‘unbelievable amounts’ of money on online 
activity. He was instructed to experiment:
In 1998, when I became chief of multimedia, the first thing [VG’s editor-in-chief] 
said to me was: ‘I expect you to make many mistakes’. When one is young and 
ambitious, one doesn’t want to make mistakes at all. But he explained that for 
a pioneering area like VG Nett, it is essential to stay the course and do a lot of 
testing. It is when you first dare to make mistakes that you know you are doing 
something right. If you only hold back and don’t dare to make mistakes, then you 
miss out on good opportunities. VG had the money to do that. That was what made 
us number one. (News editor VG Nett, 1998-2000, 23-10-2007)
The chief of multimedia indicates that experimenting and getting experience with the 
new medium was the main focus. They experimented with a mild form of multi-skilling 
of journalists and were involved in a project to provide a Norwegian CNN website. In 
addition to news, their web pages offered chat-rooms, online games, debates, access 
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to webcams in public spaces, etc. VG Nett has also offered online video since 1998. In 
the first phase they produced some reports on sporting events, but an external partner 
mainly provided the video items. During this phase online video was limited, not least 
because most users’ bandwidth was low. 
During the first period for VG Nett these diverse activities developed their capabilities 
in regard to competencies, resources and processes. But there was also a certain amount 
of scepticism from the editor and journalists of the written paper, fearing that they were 
subsidizing the online edition that was available on the Internet for free: 
We were definitely considered a threat to the printed paper. ‘Cannibalization’ used 
to be a much used expression among editors and newspaper journalists at that time. 
And that is very natural, of course. (News editor VG Nett 1998-2000, 23-10-2007) 
We can interpret this statement as revealing a difference in values between the differ-
ent actors, judging the situation from either an offline or an online position. By using 
a spin-off strategy in the next phase they focussed on developing their online offering 
on its own terms.
Phase 2: Spin-off Model (2000-2009)
VG Multimedia is responsible for producing the online paper VG Nett. Although situated 
in the same building as the newspaper and 100 per cent owned by the mother company 
VG AS, VG Nett became an independent company in 2000.4 An editor-in-chief is in 
charge of all online activity. 
After the dot-com crash in 2001, there was a much stronger focus on limiting expen-
ditures. This frugality has contributed to the organic growth of VG Nett. There are no big 
investments without a confirmation that there is demand. “Our policy is to have limited 
claims and expectations as to income in the initial phase, but to build models that give 
us more income as increased traffic shows results” (VG 2002: 33).
The separation between the newspaper and the web was maintained during this 
period.5 One main reason our interviewees gave was the difference in competencies 
between a newspaper and an online journalist. VG Nett has mostly recruited journalists 
trained in online news production. In 2007 the then editor-in-chief of VG Nett used a 
metaphor from the sporting world: ‘One cannot have a short-track athlete running the 
marathon nor the other way round’ (interview 7-04-2008). The present editor-in-chief 
also used the same metaphor. In the report on media houses in Norway, he calls their 
model ‘the focus model’: the ideal is for VG Nett to focus entirely on the web, and the 
newspaper entirely on the paper edition. But he also mentions that the two organizations 
cooperate on the basis of editorial projects (Hjeltnes et al. 2008:5).
But it is not only a question of competencies. The editor-in-chief explains how he 
hates the word ‘synergy’, and how he thinks that ‘the costs of synergies are gigantic’. 
Often the cultural aspects of synergy are overlooked. Should, for example, VG Nett wait 
to publish a story because they want to be polite and shield the paper version? He then 
discusses the disadvantages of integration and argues that offline and online production 
require different ways of thinking:
And I think, naturally enough, that the culture in a newspaper is quite tied to 
publishing one issue every day. They consider that what we do is a bit radical, 
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something they are interested in learning. But mentally we are in the next phase. 
It isn’t a question of whether we will publish; the question is whether we will get 
it out on YouTube. Do you see? So mentally we are almost on different planets. 
(Editor-in-chief VG Nett, 30-04-2009) 
These citations indicate that not only different competencies are involved, but also dif-
ferent processes and values. Journalists at VG Nett are skilled in online publication; the 
news gathering, processing and distribution routines are different, as are the values and 
norms that guide the journalist. This ‘online way of working and thinking’ is also used 
in the production of online video.
Video on the Web
One of the activities under the online news editor is the production of videos integrated 
into VG Nett’s web pages (VGTV). Being well aware that professional video production 
requires heavy investments and processes different from text production, they decided 
to use a web-specific approach to online video production. Videos on VGTV are often 
different from traditional television reports. Sometimes raw (unedited) recordings are put 
online without commentary, and many clips do not comply with traditional dramaturgical 
rules, and so on. Using partly semi-professional equipment and less time-consuming ed-
iting, their video production is more in line with online production processes and values. 
According to VGTV’s leadership, this is deliberate. They do not want to make what 
they call ‘TV-TV’, that is, traditional television reports, but rather they want to make 
use of the advantages of the Internet. As the producer explains:
We produce TV-like reports when it is required, but not necessarily. […] We 
concentrate on live transmissions: we do a straight interview when the text tells 
enough about the rest. The main thing is that we do web-TV on the terms of the 
Internet. What would you click on? Plus the big news stories at all times. But 
we don’t make television for the sake of making television. We do so when it is 
proper to do so. (TOM/Producer VG Nett, 22-06-2009)
Even though the ambition was not to make too much ‘TV-TV’, VGTV often covered 
the same live stories that the television news channels were covering, and they were 
becoming increasingly similar. In the fall of 2008, the clicks on VGTV were falling, and 
management changed VGTV’s profile. In an attempt to make users click from the text 
story to the video, they urged journalists to focus on intriguing headings and tabloid-like 
stories. Such stories could easily be picked up from the press bureaus, like Reuters or 
AP, or even from YouTube.
In addition to small video reports, VGTV focuses on big events. The 9/11 attack raised 
the level of awareness of the importance of live streaming and prompted the purchase of 
portable hardware that could stream live on the Internet. The editor-in-chief was aware 
how different platforms could be involved in covering these kinds of events. VG Nett, 
by using adequate resources during big news events, is able to encourage the user to 
regard this media outlet as an indispensable source of information.
I knew relatively quickly that VG enjoyed a high level of credibility as a news 
supplier when big news stories were occurring. Early on we had started using all 
available resources for one story – if we had a big story, we used all resources on 
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the case and forgot about the rest. Because on September 11th you don’t use that 
much time on other stories but the World Trade Center, do you? [...] and this has 
been essential for our development. We are number-nerds here, so we analyse 
everything we do. The absolute biggest event was the Tsunami, and the second 
was in fact the collapse of the flat in Ålesund last week. (Editor-in-chief VG Nett 
2000-2008, 7-04-2008)
Being able to concentrate on these big breaking stories is, thus, a priority as it leads to 
many hits on the web pages. In these cases, it is also vital to have video so people can 
watch the material as it becomes available. In the collapse of the flat, VG Nett put up a 
real-time web camera so people could see what was happening (there was a chance that 
other parts of the building would also collapse). 
By integrating all online news production under the editor-in-chief, VG Nett has the 
possibility to organize production according to the circumstances, focusing on big events 
when they occur, and more widely dispersed over a larger number of issues otherwise.
The combination of spinning out a new organization has been successful. VG Nett 
has maintained its position as Norway’s most used website, while operating profits 
for VG Multimedia rose from 19 million NOK in 2004 to 108 million in 2007 (VG 
2004, VG 2007). Although it entailed a certain degree of cannibalism vis-à-vis the 
printed paper, the organization avoided having to integrate irreconcilable values and 
processes. TV 2, in its turn, has used different models to organize their continuous 
news production. 
Television: TV 2
TV 2 started in 1992 as a result of a political decision to establish a nationwide com-
mercial television channel in Norway. From the start, TV 2 has had a combination of 
owners (Lund et al. 2009). In 2010, the Danish media group Egmont and the Norwegian 
A-pressen each own 50 per cent. TV 2 was the only television broadcaster allowed to 
carry advertisements on the nationwide analogue terrestrial network, but it was also 
obliged to provide certain programmes (new, current affairs, programmes for children, 
etc.), and the main office had to be situated in Norway’s second-largest city, Bergen. 
Apart from the news and current affairs, TV 2 uses independent producers. Although the 
public service broadcaster NRK was market leader with 37 % of the market in 2009, TV 
2 was the leading commercial television broadcaster with a 27.9 % share.6
Phase 1: Experimentation – Video on the Web (1997-2002)
TV 2 began its Internet site in 1997 through a subsidiary company, Dagens tv.7 During 
the first years, the site consisted mostly of programme-related information, repurposed 
television news and advertisements. One of the main achievements of these years was to 
make available a streamed version of their television newscasts on the Web (Fagerjord 
2006:244). In addition TV 2 invested in interactive services and experimented with 
original online content aimed at niche groups (literature, extreme sports and games). 
Still, there was also a focus on delivering television programmes online. Under the name 
Frihet (Freedom), TV 2 offered access to an archive of its own television productions. 
In addition, a special Internet reality series was produced (Fagerjord 2006: 266). 
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In this first experimental stage, TV 2 invested resources in testing different pos-
sibilities online. The Internet activity was assembled as a separate organization, but 
it relied both on the recirculation of television programmes and on content connected 
to television programmes, and consequently processes and values were not radically 
changed. Original online news production was rather low. According to the manager of 
Frihet’s successor, SUMO, the possibility of TV 2 losing its licence at the end of 2002 
did influence their online commitment:
Our strategy was that if we were to lose our licence on the analogue net, we would 
still have cable and satellite left. Then we could turn to the Internet. (Manager 
SUMO, 26-05-2009)
The stress on using the Web for video thus seems to be dependent on political factors. 
Still the experimentations had an important influence on their thinking about business 
models for the Internet. In 2001, the advertising revenues dropped, and TV 2 had to 
scale down, from 104 to 55 employees. But, according to the manager of SUMO, they 
had learned some important lessons, chiefly that unique online video content was not 
much in demand. 
By the end of 2001, we decided to change from financing by advertisement to 
charging the users. [...] In 2004 we had a 650,000 NOK turnover, and we were 
the first to have the users pay for access to Internet content in Norway. (Manager 
SUMO, 26-05-2009) 
The re-circulation of content from television was popular and people were willing to pay 
for it. In this way, TV 2 were rather unique in charging users for access to their web TV.
Phase 2: Acquisitions (2002-2007)
TV 2 was reorganized in 2002 when a new holding company (TV 2 Group) was estab-
lished. TV 2 Group announced on their web pages that its main strategy was to develop 
into ‘a broad electronic media group with Internet services and products for new elec-
tronic media platforms’. Realizing that convergence required more radical changes, 
TV 2 Group changed their strategy and employed an acquisition model to expand their 
activities to different media. 
While web TV was one of TV 2’s main activities on the Internet, the provision of 
online news was less developed. In 2003 TV 2 bought an existing online news portal 
(Nettavisen). Nettavisen was to be coordinated with TV 2 Interactive, but the two were 
maintained separately as a site for news and a site for video and entertainment, respec-
tively (TV 2 2003: 9, 22). In 2006, they also bought an existing national radio channel 
(Kanal 24). By using the acquisition model, the group tried to create a media house 
where different media complemented each other in reaching the users throughout the 
day: television during the evening, radio and Internet during the day. 
The integration of television, radio and the Internet appears to have been difficult. 
The relations between television, TV 2 Interactive and Nettavisen were tense. Nettavisen 
was sold again in 2009. As the News Director of TV 2 explained:
And the biggest and most difficult [problem] is that neither Nettavisen nor we feel 
we are related to each other. We don’t feel we work for each other when we deliver 
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for each other. And that is because for people in TV 2, Nettavisen was bought and 
a very different brand. Their culture and ways of prioritizing news criteria, their 
way of behaving and things like that, it did not match with TV 2. And the other 
way round – people in Nettavisen thought that TV 2 people were some arrogant 
pricks who don’t know the Internet, who have no interest […] to do the simplest 
things that we should have done to help Nettavisen in their competition with VG 
Nett. And they both are right; so it’s a very good thing that is happening now, to 
try and stand on our own (News Director TV 2, 9-4-2008)
What the News Director explains as cultural differences can, in Christensen and Over-
dorf’s terms, be interpreted as differences in values that led to ineffective relations 
and made it difficult to obtain the synergy this acquisition was expected to deliver. 
The integration of radio was also difficult. Even though some of Radio 24’s journalists 
were working at a radio desk in TV 2’s editorial rooms, cultural differences inhibited 
fruitful cooperation. In many ways, TV 2, by acquiring existing organizations, became 
trapped in the situation that Christensen and Overdorf describe as a pitfall: an attempt 
to integrate acquired organizations into the main organization and thus sapping their 
process and value capabilities. 
Phase 3: Internal Integration (2007-2009)
The switchover from analogue to digital terrestrial digital television in Norway started 
2007 and was completed in 2009. TV 2 had been an active actor in this process, owning 
one-third of Norges Television, the owner of the digital terrestrial net. The TV 2 group has 
regarded the establishing of multiple new television channels as a way of differentiating 
their sources of revenue. Starting in 2005, they established an all-round entertainment 
channel (together with Telenor) and different theme channels (Sports, News and Film), 
first distributed on satellite and cable, and from 2007 also through the terrestrial net.
After selling Radio 24, and already before Nettavisen was sold, TV 2 launched an-
other Internet-based solution in March 2008. TV 2 Interactive was reorganized and re-
named TV2.no. The headings on the Internet site indicate the main activities on the Web: 
News, Entertainment, Sport and Weather, along with the online pay service, SUMO. Ac-
cording to the editor and head of TV2.no, they have learned from their experiences with 
Nettavisen, and they are now trying to grow from the inside out. They are attempting 
to motivate the different editorial boards to deliver content for TV2.no and in this way 
create more ownership with the Web. She also stresses that the new strategy implies more 
interactivity and synergy between television and the Internet (Interview, 6-04-2009). 
The fact that Internet news can be constantly updated is considered a threat to televi-
sion’s traditional newscasts:
Yes, people have access to the Internet, and they are able to update themselves 
during the day. That’s why fewer are watching the evening news. It is a stable, but 
declining curve, and it has been in decline for the last eight years. If you look at 
the curve found in countries like Sweden, Denmark, UK, and Norway, you will 
find an identical line. It is an international phenomenon. Are we going to sit still 
and not act? Or are we going to reach out to people over the Internet, just like the 
others? (Editor of News TV 2, 8-11-2007)
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As a result of this perceived threat, TV 2 introduced Nyhetskanalen [The News Channel], 
a specialized 24/7 news television channel, in 2007. This digital channel is distributed 
both as a digital television channel and through the Internet (SUMO).
Nyhetskanalen
Foreign 24/7 news channels existed before, but TV 2 used an innovative way to organize 
the channel. While other channels have a fully manned editorial board for their news 
channel, TV 2 developed software that enables the broadcasts to be run by only two 
persons.8 In addition, experienced news hosts and only a few journalists and editors 
were appointed. In addition, Nyhetskanalen draws mostly from other editorial boards. 
At the heart of this model is a data server into which all the moving news images are 
loaded. From there they can be processed and used on different platforms. As the news 
director stated:
The strategy is about developing maximum creativity, but also the least possible 
resource-demanding systems into which to put the material. Distribution of digi-
tal channels is a form of illusion – the channel outwardly appears as a channel, 
but internally it is more about the structuring of production than the division of 
channels. (News Director TV 2, 9-04-2008) 
By using new technical solutions and routines, live broadcasts, items from other depart-
ments, experienced hosts who can keep an interview going, invited guests to comment 
on the news and replayed interesting quotations from the studio interviews to develop 
the news issue, Nyhetskanalen has managed to fill the channel’s air time.
The model chosen for news production implied changes in capabilities of not only 
resources (e.g., technology and competencies in using different media forms), but also 
in processes and values. Reporters from existing departments (Sports Department, 
Political Department, etc.) were required to change their processes and also to deliver 
material for Nyhetskanalen, often as live reports. This strategy has also extended to the 
Web, where journalists are expected to deliver their material. 
The news editor refers to an entrepreneurial culture in TV 2 when asked how they 
succeed in making their employees change working routines:
It is all about TV 2 employees looking at themselves as: yes, we can make it. 
People in NRK and other places are slow, we are fast, quick to turn. […] For bet-
ter or for worse, this myth or self-conception continues in the TV 2 system. […] 
The will to work unconventionally is very high, there are short lines and very 
few formal structures, very few institutional solutions or functions (News editor 
TV 2, 9-4-2008). 
Even though ambiguous, calling it a myth, the news editor is convinced that the cor-
porate culture of change will encourage the whole organization to rethink and change 
its routines. The new activity (producing continuously updated news) is thus supposed 
to foster changes in the whole production process and also in the way traditional news 
is produced.
Nyhetskanalen thus represents an innovative way of producing digital audiovisual 
news. A prerequisite was the digital switchover. Using the opportunities of digital televi-
sion to develop new technology and to change values and processes within the entire 
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company, the management wished to achieve synergy between the different departments, 
and to generate content for the main channel, the news channel and updates on the web-
site. It is also part of TV 2’s ‘breaking-news strategy’: in 2009 TV 2 defined breaking 
news as their main target.9 In this area they directly compete with VGTV, which also 
covers major events with live broadcasts online. 
Services, Organization and Business Models
Comparing the two organizations is difficult as much of their existing capabilities, prod-
ucts and surroundings differ. Television, e.g., is a more politically regulated area than 
newspapers, and we saw that worries about getting their licence renewed prompted TV 2 
to develop video on the Web. In addition, digital television is limited to a certain number 
of channels – even though the number is larger than before. TV 2’s strategy of differentiat-
ing their portfolio by providing more television channels (sports, entertainment, film, etc.) 
is different from VG’s strategy of having a large array of services on the Internet (varying 
from news, communities and debate forums to dating and commercial services delivered 
by others). These strategies have consequences for their business models – in VG’s case 
these services contribute to augmenting the clicks on VG Nett and to the possibility of 
financing it through advertisements only. For TV 2, the increased number of TV channels 
they provide does not have this accumulative effect, but may strengthen their position 
vis-à-vis distributors to pay more for distributing a popular package.
Taking these kinds of differences into account, we can still compare the organizational 
models they have used throughout the years, focussing on innovation of continuous 
news production. After the first experimental phase with no clear model for rolling 
news, TV 2 tried to build a media house with complementary offerings. They expected 
synergies from the acquisition of external media companies. The problems of having the 
different departments collaborate were insurmountable, and they developed hierarchies 
and thought more about their own interests than that of the company as a whole. Other 
researchers have also noted the tendencies towards cultural cleavages and sub-optimal 
behaviours at TV 2 (Kjus 2009: 135) and other media companies (Erdal 2008, Deuze, 
2007: 177; Caldwell, 2008: 272).
In the last phase, TV 2 has focused more on television. They have extended the 
number of channels enabled by digital television distribution. As most programmes are 
produced externally, this extension has not resulted in changing production processes, 
but Nyhetskanalen is the focus of fundamental changes in production. Not only was new 
technology implemented for this channel, but also new capabilities were developed. 
These capabilities were intended to be integrated into the existing organization, not only 
through the creation of separate ‘spaces’, but also by changing existing competencies, 
processes and values throughout the company. This has been an ongoing process that 
seems to have been rather successful during their first years, but, of course, it is an open 
question whether it will succeed in the long run. 
In contrast, VG after the experimental stage has followed a spin-off strategy. The im-
mediacy and interactivity of the Web requires different resources, processes and values 
than traditional offline journalism does. VG has chosen to keep the offline and online 
activity separate, as two organizations that possess different capabilities. This organiza-
tional divergence has prevented VG from gaining synergy out of the offline and online 
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combination, but it has enabled them to concentrate successfully on the specificities of 
each medium. In this respect, VG has resisted a movement towards convergence, as 
described by Dailey et al. (2003).10 
However, online VG Nett still aims for integration under one editor-in-chief. The inte-
gration of moving news pictures was challenging, because traditional television requires 
capabilities quite different from those needed for textual and photographic production. 
Instead of following traditional television production routines and values, VG has opted 
for an innovative way of producing video, which is fast, cheap and adapted to online 
production and consumption. 
The business models of VG and TV 2 have changed. While the printed newspaper 
is financed by a combination of pay-per-copy and advertisements, VG Nett seems to 
be one of the few that have succeeded in making profits online through advertisements 
alone owing to the sheer number of clicks. TV 2 has gone from being financed solely by 
advertisements to a combination of advertisements and pay arrangements. The problems 
of having customers pay for services on the Internet is urgent in many fields (e.g., mu-
sic, film), and recent discussions about charging online readers reflect the importance 
of developing healthy business models. By having its users pay for their web TV offer, 
TV 2 is rather rare, even in the international context. 
Conclusions
We have used Christensen and Overdorf’s frame as an alternative, or partly an addi-
tion, to existing theories of convergence. Our cases show the relative usefulness of this 
theoretical framework for identifying innovations and the challenges they imply. Our 
two examples are noteworthy not because they are representative, but because they 
show different ways of dealing with disruptive change. In addition they represent the 
two largest commercial media organizations in Norway that are likely to inspire others.
Both started with an experimental internal phase but later used different models to 
organize their news production. By establishing a spin-off, separated from the printed 
newspaper, VG retreated from synergies between online and offline productions, but 
gained by having two organizations dedicated to the processes and values of each me-
dium. Their online services are financed by advertisements alone. The commercially 
financed television channel, TV 2, used an acquisition model, but encountered problems 
with integrating the parts. Today, their strategy involves a proliferation of digital TV 
channels, financed by a combination of advertisements and payment from viewers. Not 
only their Internet site, but particularly their 24/7 news channel Nyhetskanalen is a 
central element in the production of continuous news.
In a digital environment the circulation and reuse of news items on different platforms 
is possible, but in our interviews the managers often pointed to the role of cultural differ-
ences in impeding this integration. This seems to be a major problem in their perception 
of how to deal with innovation. Even though culture may be an important hindrance to 
innovation, we also saw how TV 2 tried to use culture as a resource. TV 2’s attempt to 
use its disruptive innovation (Nyhetskanalen) to change the existing organization repre-
sents an interesting extension of Christensen and Overdorf’s theory. Instead of shielding 
new organizational processes by creating internal ‘spaces’ with different processes and 
values, TV 2’s aim is to change the existing organizational processes and values. In 
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the view of management, their main assets are effective technology and an innovative 
culture. Further research on implementation and institutionalization of Nyhetskanalen 
will show whether these are enough to change their capabilities in a dynamic field where 
there is a need for constant innovation.
Notes
 1. We thank our informants for their cooperation and the referees and various colleagues for their construc-
tive comments.
 2. Figures from Mediebedriftens Landforening, (http://www.mediebedriftene.no/index.asp?id=96649, ac-
cessed 5-10-2010).
 3. Source: www.tns-gallup.no. The total population of Norway is 4.8 million (2008).
 4. At the administrative level, the cooperation is well developed. VG Nett buys all administrative services, 
such as the switchboard, human-resource management, user support, IT department, etc., from VG.
 5. The interviews were conducted in 2007-2009 – by the end of 2010, VG changed its model by integrating 
on- and offline production. 
 6. In 2009 the main channel of TV 2 had a market share of 22.1 per cent, and all channels of the TV 2 group 
27.9 per cent (Source: Medienorge/TNS Gallup available on: http://medienorge.uib.no/?cat=statistikk
&medium=tv&aspekt=&queryID=219, accessed 5-10-2010).
 7. Renamed Net2 Interactive the same year, and since 2000 called TV 2 Interactive (Fagerjord 2006:224).
 8. The software is called Mosart, see: http://www.mosartmedialab.no/
 9. Application for a new licence November 2009.
 10. Garcia Avilés et al. (2009: 300) mention that the autonomous model of the Austrian newspaper Der Stand-
ard also seems to be a major factor in their success.
References
Boczkowski, P.J. (2004) Digitizing the News: Innovation in Online Newspapers. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Caldwell, J.T. (2008) Production Culture: Industrial Reflexivity and Critical Practice in Film and Television. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
Christensen, C.M. (1997) The Innovator’s Dilemma. N.Y.: Harper Business Essentials.
Christensen, C.M. & Overdorf, M. (2000) ‘Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change.’ Harvard Business 
Review, March-April.
Dailey, L., Demo, L., & Spillman, M. (2003) ‘The Convergence Continuum: A Model for Studying Collabora-
tion Between Media Newsrooms.’ Paper presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and 
Mass Communication. 
Domingo, D. (2004) ‘Comparing professional routines and values in online newsrooms: A reflection from a 
case study.’ Paper presented at the 2004 IAMCR conference, Porto-Alegre (Brazil). 
Domingo, D. (2006) Inventing Online Journalism: Developments of the Internet as a News Medium in four 
Catalan Newsrooms. PhD thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
Deuze, M. (2007) Media Work. Cambridge: Polity.
Deuze, M. (2008) ‘Epilogue. Toward a Sociology of Online News.’ In: Paterson, C. & Domingo D. (eds.) 
Making Online News: The Ethnography of New Media Production. New York: Peter Lang.
Erdal, I.J. (2008) Cross-Media News Journalism. Institutional, Professional and Textual Strategies and 
Practices in Multi-Platform New Production, PhD thesis, Oslo: Unipub.
Fagerjord, A. (2003) Rhetorical Convergence : Earlier Media Influence on Web Media Form. PhD thesis, 
Oslo: Unipub. 
Fagerjord, A. (2006) ’Frihet. TV 2 på nett.’ In: Enli et al. (eds) Et Hjem for oss – et hjem for deg? analyser av 
TV 2 1992-2002. [A home for us – a home for you? Analyses of TV 2 1992-2002] Kristiansand: IJ-forlag.
Garcia Avilés, J.A., Meier, K., Kaltenbrunner, A, Carvajal, M. & Kraus, D. (2009) ‘Newsroom Integration in 
Austria, Spain and Germany’, Journalism Practice, 3 (3) 285-303.
Garcia Avilés, J.A. & Carvajal, M. (2008) ‘Integrated and Cross-Media Newsroom Convergence: Two Mod-
els of Multimedia News Production – The Cases of Novotécnica and La Verdad Multimedia in Spain.’ 
Convergence, 14 (2) 221-239. 
Hjeltnes, G., Olsen, R.K. & Bech-Karlsen, J. (2008) Rapport fra ti norske mediehus: En studie av flermediale 
løsninger. [Report from ten media houses: a study of multimedia solutions] Oslo/Fredrikstad: Handels-
høyskolen BI/Institutt for Journalistikk.
81
Maria Theresa Konow Lund & Roel Puijk Rolling News as Disruptive Change
Hjeltnes, G., Olsen, R.K. & Bech-Karlsen, J. (2009) Mediehusrapporten 2009. [Media house report 2009]. 
Available at http://www.mediehus.org/mediehusrapporten2009ver1.pdf.
Kjus, Y. (2009) Event Media. Television Production Crossing Media Boundaries. PhD-thesis, Oslo: Unipub.
Lund A.B, Nord L. & Roppen J. (2009) Nye udfordringer for gamle medier. [New challenges for old media] 
Göteborg: NORDICOM.
Moe, H. & Syvertsen T. (2007) Media Institutions as a Research Field: Three phases of Norwegian Broadcast-
ing Research. Nordicom Review. Jubilee Issue, 149-167.
Paterson, C. & Domingo D. (eds.) (2008) Making Online News: The Ethnography of New Media Production. 
New York: Peter Lang.
Puijk, R. (2007) ‘Time and Timing in Cross-media Production’. In: G. Lekakos , K. Chorianopoulos and G. 
Doukidis (eds) Interactive Digital Television: Technologies and Applications. IGI publishing: Hershey/
New York.
Storsul, T. & D. Stuedahl (eds.) (2007) Ambivalence towards Convergence: Digitalization and Media Change. 
Göteborg: Nordicom. 
TV 2 (2002, 2003) TV 2 Gruppen årsrapport 2002, 2003 [TV 2 Group Annual Report 2002, 2003]. Bergen.
VG (2002-2007) Årsrapport 2002 -2007 [VG Annual Report 2002 – 2007]. Oslo.
Interviews
VG Nett:
Hansen, Espen Egil, Editor-in-chief VG Multimedia, interview, 26-6-2007 and 30-4-2009.
Hansen, Pål, Technical operational manager/Producer, VG Multimedia. Several interviews. email, 22-06-2009.
Hønningstad, Thomas Manus, Manager VGTV, interview, 20-06-2008.
Nielsen, Frode, News editor VG Nett 1998-2000, interview, 23-10-2007.
Pedersen, Torry, Editor-in-chief VG Multimedia 2000-2008, interview, 7-04-2008.
TV 2:
Helland, Kjell Øvre, News Director, interview, 9-04-2008.
Hildrum, Alf, Editor-in-chief TV 2, interview, 16-05-2008.
Høibraaten, Helge, Manager SUMO, TV 2, interview, 26.05.2009.
Indrøy, Rune, Director of Communication, TV 2, interview, 20-05-2009.
Fjellberg, Trine, Editor and head of TV 2.no, interview, 6-04-2009.
Stavrum, Gunnar, Editor-in-chief, TV 2 Interactive/Nettavisen, interview, 15-04-2008.
Tjemsland, Gaute, News Editor, TV 2, email, 22-05-2009.
Årsæther, Jan Ove, Editor of News, TV 2, interview, 8-11-2007.

